AWS Glue Dev Endpoint Lifecycle Events (Create/Update/Delete) via CloudTrail
Flags Glue Create/Update/DeleteDevEndpoint API activity in CloudTrail that may indicate suspicious development endpoint management.
- Product
- aws
- Service
- cloudtrail
- Author
- Austin Songer @austinsonger (SigmaHQ), DRL 1.1
- Published
- 2021-10-03
- Updated
- 2026-07-31
What it detects
This rule flags AWS Glue development endpoint activity by matching CloudTrail events for CreateDevEndpoint, UpdateDevEndpoint, and DeleteDevEndpoint with eventSource set to glue.amazonaws.com. Attackers may use these endpoints to manipulate or accelerate interactions with AWS Glue components during privilege escalation or other unauthorized activity. Detection relies on CloudTrail telemetry that records the initiating identity and the specific Glue API operations invoked.
Reporting behind it
- rhinosecuritylabs.comhttps://rhinosecuritylabs.com/aws/aws-privilege-escalation-methods-mitigation/
- docs.aws.amazon.comhttps://docs.aws.amazon.com/glue/latest/webapi/API_CreateDevEndpoint.html
- github.comhttps://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/cloud/aws/cloudtrail/aws_passed_role_to_glue_development_endpoint.yml
Changelog
v5- v5Candidate ingested via manual entry.2026-07-31
- v4Candidate ingested via manual entry.2026-07-31
- v3Candidate ingested via manual entry.2026-07-31
- v2Candidate ingested via manual entry.2026-07-31
- v1No changelog recorded for this version.2026-07-30
Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.
title: AWS Glue Dev Endpoint Lifecycle Events (Create/Update/Delete) via CloudTrail
id: 9146423e-827e-424c-8b28-58692c1ec12b
status: test
description: This rule flags AWS Glue development endpoint activity by matching CloudTrail events for CreateDevEndpoint, UpdateDevEndpoint, and DeleteDevEndpoint with eventSource set to glue.amazonaws.com. Attackers may use these endpoints to manipulate or accelerate interactions with AWS Glue components during privilege escalation or other unauthorized activity. Detection relies on CloudTrail telemetry that records the initiating identity and the specific Glue API operations invoked.
references:
- https://rhinosecuritylabs.com/aws/aws-privilege-escalation-methods-mitigation/
- https://docs.aws.amazon.com/glue/latest/webapi/API_CreateDevEndpoint.html
- https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/cloud/aws/cloudtrail/aws_passed_role_to_glue_development_endpoint.yml
author: Austin Songer @austinsonger, Huntrule Team
date: 2021-10-03
modified: 2022-12-18
tags:
- attack.privilege-escalation
logsource:
product: aws
service: cloudtrail
detection:
selection:
eventSource: glue.amazonaws.com
eventName:
- CreateDevEndpoint
- DeleteDevEndpoint
- UpdateDevEndpoint
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Glue Development Endpoint Activity may be performed by a system administrator. Verify whether the user identity, user agent, and/or hostname should be making changes in your environment.
- If known behavior is causing false positives, it can be exempted from the rule.
level: low
license: DRL-1.1
related:
- id: 4990c2e3-f4b8-45e3-bc3c-30b14ff0ed26
type: derived