Azure Entra Audit Logs: Temporary Access Pass Method Added to an Account

Flags admin registration of a temporary access pass method in Azure audit logs for user accounts.

FreeReviewedSigma · High · v5

Product: azure
Service: auditlogs
Author: Mark Morowczynski '@markmorow', Yochana Henderson, '@Yochana-H' (SigmaHQ), DRL 1.1
Published: 2022-08-10
Updated: 2026-07-31

ATT&CK techniques

Initial Access → Defense Evasion

Recon
Resource Dev
Initial Access
- T1078.004Cloud Accounts
Execution
Persistence
- T1078.004Cloud Accounts
Priv Esc
- T1078.004Cloud Accounts
Defense Evasion
- T1078.004Cloud Accounts
Cred Access
Discovery
Lateral Movement
Collection
C2
Exfiltration
Impact

What it detects

This rule matches audit log events indicating an administrator registered a security info method specifically for adding a temporary access pass (TAP) for a user. Adding a TAP can provide an alternative authentication path and may be used for initial access, persistence, or stealth if performed on privileged accounts. The detection relies on Azure audit log messages and status text that explicitly reference registering a temporary access pass method.

Reporting behind it

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Azure Entra Audit Logs: Temporary Access Pass Method Added to an Account

Pivot detection · T1078.004 · 9 related

Changelog

v5
Candidate ingested via manual entry.2026-07-31
v4
Candidate ingested via manual entry.2026-07-31
v3
Candidate ingested via manual entry.2026-07-31
v2
Candidate ingested via manual entry.2026-07-31
v1
No changelog recorded for this version.2026-07-30

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.

azure-ad-audit-logs-temporary-access-pass-added-to-an-account-fa84aaf5

title: "Azure Entra Audit Logs: Temporary Access Pass Method Added to an Account"
id: 1d339b38-0150-49f8-9a32-1843e21c0ed7
status: test
description: This rule matches audit log events indicating an administrator registered a security info method specifically for adding a temporary access pass (TAP) for a user. Adding a TAP can provide an alternative authentication path and may be used for initial access, persistence, or stealth if performed on privileged accounts. The detection relies on Azure audit log messages and status text that explicitly reference registering a temporary access pass method.
references:
  - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/architecture/security-operations-privileged-accounts#changes-to-privileged-accounts
  - https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/cloud/azure/audit_logs/azure_tap_added.yml
author: Mark Morowczynski '@markmorow', Yochana Henderson, '@Yochana-H', Huntrule Team
date: 2022-08-10
tags:
  - attack.privilege-escalation
  - attack.initial-access
  - attack.persistence
  - attack.stealth
  - attack.t1078.004
logsource:
  product: azure
  service: auditlogs
detection:
  selection:
    properties.message: Admin registered security info
    Status: Admin registered temporary access pass method for user
  condition: selection
falsepositives:
  - Administrator adding a legitimate temporary access pass
level: high
license: DRL-1.1
related:
  - id: fa84aaf5-8142-43cd-9ec2-78cfebf878ce
    type: derived

Convert

This rule as a query you can run. Uses no unlock credit.

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