Azure AD Audit Logs: User Added to Administrator Role
Flags Azure AD audit events where a user is added to an Admin/Administrator role.
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azure-ad-audit-logs-user-added-to-administrator-role-ebbeb024
title: "Azure AD Audit Logs: User Added to Administrator Role"
id: 64f31563-13a0-439b-ab9c-f9878ffdb3c0
status: test
description: This rule identifies Azure AD audit log events where a user is added as a member to an administrator role, matching operations named 'Add member to role' targeting resources containing 'Admins' or 'Administrator'. Granting administrator role membership is a high-impact step that can enable privilege escalation and persistent control if performed by an unauthorized actor. The detection relies on Azure audit log telemetry with the operation name and the targeted role names in the event payload.
references:
- https://web.archive.org/web/20250904191633/https://m365internals.com/2021/07/13/what-ive-learned-from-doing-a-year-of-cloud-forensics-in-azure-ad/
- https://research.splunk.com/cloud/a28f0bc3-3400-4a6e-a2da-89b9e95f0d2a/
- https://analyticsrules.exchange/analyticrules/2a09f8cb-deb7-4c40-b08b-9137667f1c0b/
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/monitoring-health/reference-audit-activities#core-directory
- https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/cloud/azure/audit_logs/azure_ad_user_added_to_admin_role.yml
author: Raphaël CALVET, @MetallicHack, Huntrule Team
date: 2021-10-04
modified: 2026-04-30
tags:
- attack.initial-access
- attack.persistence
- attack.privilege-escalation
- attack.stealth
- attack.t1098.003
- attack.t1078
logsource:
product: azure
service: auditlogs
detection:
selection:
operationName: Add member to role
properties.targetResources|contains:
- Admins
- Administrator
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- PIM (Privileged Identity Management) generates this event each time 'eligible role' is enabled.
level: medium
license: DRL-1.1
related:
- id: ebbeb024-5b1d-4e16-9c0c-917f86c708a7
type: derived
What it detects
This rule identifies Azure AD audit log events where a user is added as a member to an administrator role, matching operations named 'Add member to role' targeting resources containing 'Admins' or 'Administrator'. Granting administrator role membership is a high-impact step that can enable privilege escalation and persistent control if performed by an unauthorized actor. The detection relies on Azure audit log telemetry with the operation name and the targeted role names in the event payload.
Known false positives
- PIM (Privileged Identity Management) generates this event each time 'eligible role' is enabled.
Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.