Azure Audit Logs: User Elevated to User Access Administrator Across Azure Subscriptions

Flags Azure AuditLogs events where a user is assigned to User Access Administrator, enabling full subscription management.

FreeReviewedSigma · High · v7

Product: azure
Service: auditlogs
Author: Austin Songer @austinsonger (SigmaHQ), DRL 1.1
Published: 2021-11-26
Updated: 2026-10-03

Analysis Detection

ATT&CK techniques

Initial Access → Defense Evasion

Recon
Resource Dev
Initial Access
- T1078Valid Accounts
Execution
Persistence
- T1078Valid Accounts
Priv Esc
- T1078Valid Accounts
Defense Evasion
- T1078Valid Accounts
Cred Access
Discovery
Lateral Movement
Collection
C2
Exfiltration
Impact

What it detects

This rule flags cases in Azure Audit Logs where an activity indicates a user elevated their access to the User Access Administrator role for their Azure resources. Because this permission level can grant broad management capabilities, unexpected elevation may allow an attacker to gain or maintain access to Azure subscriptions. Detection relies on the audit log fields Category and ActivityDisplayName indicating the specific RBAC elevation event.

Reporting behind it

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Azure Audit Logs: User Elevated to User Access Administrator Across Azure Subscriptions

Pivot detection · T1078 · 9 related

Changelog

v7
Candidate ingested via manual entry.2026-10-03
v5
Candidate ingested via manual entry.2026-07-31
v4
Candidate ingested via manual entry.2026-07-31
v3
Candidate ingested via manual entry.2026-07-31
v2
Candidate ingested via manual entry.2026-07-31
v1
No changelog recorded for this version.2026-07-30

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.

azure-auditlogs-permission-elevation-to-user-access-administrator-for-subscripti-ca9bf243

title: "Azure Audit Logs: User Elevated to User Access Administrator Across Azure Subscriptions"
id: e2bcddb3-cc7a-40db-8130-8b7be794a2a9
status: test
description: This rule flags cases in Azure Audit Logs where an activity indicates a user elevated their access to the User Access Administrator role for their Azure resources. Because this permission level can grant broad management capabilities, unexpected elevation may allow an attacker to gain or maintain access to Azure subscriptions. Detection relies on the audit log fields Category and ActivityDisplayName indicating the specific RBAC elevation event.
references:
  - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/architecture/security-operations-privileged-accounts#assignment-and-elevation
  - https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/cloud/azure/audit_logs/azure_subscription_permissions_elevation_via_auditlogs.yml
author: Austin Songer @austinsonger, Huntrule Team
date: 2021-11-26
modified: 2026-09-26
tags:
  - attack.privilege-escalation
  - attack.persistence
  - attack.initial-access
  - attack.stealth
  - attack.t1078
logsource:
  product: azure
  service: auditlogs
detection:
  selection:
    Category: AzureRBACRoleManagementElevateAccess
    ActivityDisplayName: User has elevated their access to User Access Administrator for their Azure Resources
  condition: selection
falsepositives:
  - If this was approved by System Administrator.
level: high
license: DRL-1.1
related:
  - id: ca9bf243-465e-494a-9e54-bf9fc239057d
    type: derived

Convert

This rule as a query you can run. Uses no unlock credit.

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