Credential Manager Access By Unusual Applications (via file_access)
This rule detects anomalous processes based on name and location that access the windows credential manager and vault. That can be a sign of credential stealing. Example case would be use of mimikatz "dpapi::cred" function
SigmamediumWindowsv1
sigma
credential-manager-access-by-unusual-applications-via-file-access
title: Credential Manager Access By Unusual Applications (via file_access)
id: 1fbf09e7-900d-5053-b2be-3dfcd0926e53
status: stable
description: This rule detects anomalous processes based on name and location that access the windows credential manager and vault. That can be a sign of credential stealing. Example case would be use of mimikatz "dpapi::cred" function
references:
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/
- https://hunter2.gitbook.io/darthsidious/privilege-escalation/mimikatz
- https://www.absolomb.com/2018-01-26-Windows-Privilege-Escalation-Guide/
author: Huntrule Team
date: 2026-03-09
tags:
- attack.t1003
- attack.credential-access
logsource:
category: file_access
product: windows
definition: 'Requirements: Microsoft-Windows-Kernel-File ETW provider'
detection:
selection:
FileName|contains:
- '\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\'
- '\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\'
- '\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Vault\'
- '\ProgramData\Microsoft\Vault\'
filter_system_folders:
Image|startswith:
- 'C:\Program Files\'
- 'C:\Program Files (x86)\'
- 'C:\Windows\system32\'
- 'C:\Windows\SysWOW64\'
condition: selection and not 1 of filter_*
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: medium
Known false positives
- Unknown
Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.