EchoGather Backdoor Components Dropped to User Windows Profile Directory (via file_event)

ATT&CK techniques

C2

Recon
Resource Dev
Initial Access
Execution
Persistence
Priv Esc
Defense Evasion
Cred Access
Discovery
Lateral Movement
Collection
C2
- T1105Ingress Tool Transfer
Exfiltration
Impact

What it detects

This rule detects creation of the EchoGather backdoor and its PowerShell loaders inside the roaming Microsoft Windows profile directory used by the Paper Werewolf campaign. Writing these specific filenames into a user profile path reflects the backdoor being staged for persistence after the malicious XLL executes.

Reporting behind it

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EchoGather Backdoor Components Dropped to User Windows Profile Directory (via file_event)

Pivot detection · T1105 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.

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