In-Memory Matanbuchus Loader DLL Sideloading via Notepad++ GenericUpdater Loading libcurl (via image_load)

PremiumReviewedSigma · High · v1
Product
windows
Category
image_load
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-09-01
Updated
2026-09-01

ATT&CK techniques

Execution → Defense Evasion
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Persistence

  6. Priv Esc

  7. Defense Evasion

  8. Cred Access

  9. Discovery

  10. Lateral Movement

  11. Collection

  12. C2

  13. Exfiltration

  14. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects the legitimate Notepad++ GUP updater GenericUpdater.exe loading libcurl.dll from a user-writable location, the DLL sideloading behavior used by the Matanbuchus 3.0 loader after delivery through a fake Notepad++ update. Adversaries leverage sideloading against a signed updater to execute the loader under a trusted process while evading process-based detection, making early detection critical for stopping the chain before regsvr32 persistence and process hollowing deploy.

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In-Memory Matanbuchus Loader DLL Sideloading via Notepad++ GenericUpdater Loading libcurl (via image_load)
Pivot detection · T1574.001 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.