In-Memory MSBuild Proxy Execution of a Project From a User-Writable Path (via process_creation)

PremiumReviewedSigma · Medium · v1
Product
windows
Category
process_creation
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-06-04
Updated
2026-08-28

ATT&CK techniques

Execution → Defense Evasion
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Persistence

  5. Priv Esc

  6. Defense Evasion

  7. Cred Access

  8. Discovery

  9. Lateral Movement

  10. Collection

  11. C2

  12. Exfiltration

  13. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects MSBuild.exe building an inline-task project file located in a user, temp or AppData directory, a pattern adversaries use to compile and run C# payloads in memory under a signed Microsoft developer utility. MSBuild proxy execution is a trusted-developer-utility abuse technique in the Red Canary Threat Detection Report. Detecting builds sourced from user-writable paths surfaces code execution that evades application allowlisting.

Related detections9 linkedT1127.001 — drag to rearrange
Malicious MSBuild Execution of Downloaded csproj Project File (via process_creation)
Suspicious MSBuild Inline Task Compilation of mini.xml
Suspicious MSBuild Execution Spawned by Command Shell for Process Hollowing (via process_creation)
Suspicious MSBuild Execution of Inline Payload (via process_creation)
Suspicious MSBuild Execution as LOLBin from User-Writable Path (via process_creation)
Suspicious Local XML Compilation via MSBuild
Malicious Winlogon Shell Hijack Loading MSBuild
Proxy Execution via MSBuild Running Inline Task XML
MSBuild Executing Non-Project File or Remote Payload
In-Memory MSBuild Proxy Execution of a Project From a User-Writable Path (via process_creation)
Pivot detection · T1127.001 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.