In-Memory Remcos RAT Keylog Store Created Under ProgramData rema (via file_event)

PremiumReviewedSigma · Medium · v1
Product
windows
Category
file_event
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-08-24
Updated
2026-08-28

ATT&CK techniques

Cred Access → Collection
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Persistence

  6. Priv Esc

  7. Defense Evasion

  8. Discovery

  9. Lateral Movement

  10. C2

  11. Exfiltration

  12. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects creation of the logs.dat file inside the ProgramData rema directory, the local store used by this Remcos RAT variant to buffer keystroke and clipboard capture before exfiltration. Adversaries leverage this staging file to accumulate stolen input on disk, making detection of the fixed path a useful indicator of active collection.

Related detections9 linkedT1056.001 — drag to rearrange
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Possible Andariel Keylogger Output Archive Staged in Temp (via file_event)
Suspicious Parallax RAT Keylogger Output File Creation via File System (via file_event)
In-Memory Remcos RAT Keylog Store Created Under ProgramData rema (via file_event)
Pivot detection · T1056.001 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.