In-Memory Remote HTA Execution via mshta Consistent with Emmenthal Loader (via process_creation)

PremiumReviewedSigma · High · v1
Product
windows
Category
process_creation
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-11-06
Updated
2026-11-06

ATT&CK techniques

Defense Evasion
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Persistence

  6. Priv Esc

  7. Defense Evasion

  8. Cred Access

  9. Discovery

  10. Lateral Movement

  11. Collection

  12. C2

  13. Exfiltration

  14. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects mshta.exe launched with an http or https argument, the signed-binary proxy execution used by the Emmenthal loader in the Lumma Stealer CAPTCHA-chaos campaign to fetch and run a remote HTA that decodes an in-memory PowerShell payload. Adversaries leverage mshta to retrieve remote script content while bypassing application controls, making early detection critical for catching the loader before Lumma Stealer is executed.

Related detections9 linkedT1218.005 — drag to rearrange
ClickFix Remote HTA Execution via Run Dialog (via process_creation)
Malicious mshta Execution Spawned by PHP-CGI (CVE-2024-4577)
Suspicious Mshta Spawned From Explorer Command Chain
Malicious Rundll32 RunHTMLApplication Remote Execution
Suspicious Mshta Execution From AppData Directory
Malicious mshta Inline JavaScript GetObject Scriptlet Execution
Malicious DLL Written to User Directory by mshta
Suspicious Remote HTA Execution via Mshta (via process_creation)
Suspicious .NET Utility Spawned by Script Host for Process Hollowing
In-Memory Remote HTA Execution via mshta Consistent with Emmenthal Loader (via process_creation)
Pivot detection · T1218.005 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.