Linux auditd: BPFDoor .pid or .lock file access in /var/run

Alerts on auditd-monitored access to specific /var/run .pid and .lock files associated with BPFDoor-style behavior.

FreeReviewedSigma · High · v3
Product
linux
Service
auditd
Author
Rafal Piasecki (SigmaHQ), DRL 1.1
Published
2022-08-10
Updated
2026-07-31

ATT&CK techniques

Execution
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Persistence

  5. Priv Esc

  6. Defense Evasion

  7. Cred Access

  8. Discovery

  9. Lateral Movement

  10. Collection

  11. C2

  12. Exfiltration

  13. Impact

What it detects

This rule flags access to specific BPFDoor-related PID and lock files under /var/run. Attackers may create or modify these files to persist, coordinate, or masquerade as legitimate system activity. It relies on Linux auditd telemetry reporting PATH events for the listed .pid and .lock files.

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Linux auditd: BPFDoor .pid or .lock file access in /var/run
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Changelog

v3
  1. v3
    Candidate ingested via manual entry.2026-07-31
  2. v2
    Candidate ingested via manual entry.2026-07-31
  3. v1
    No changelog recorded for this version.2026-07-30

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.