Malicious Active Directory Database Backup via wbadmin to Loopback Admin Share (via process_creation)

PremiumReviewedSigma · High · v1
Product
windows
Category
process_creation
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-06-27
Updated
2026-08-28

ATT&CK techniques

Cred Access
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Persistence

  6. Priv Esc

  7. Defense Evasion

  8. Cred Access

  9. Discovery

  10. Lateral Movement

  11. Collection

  12. C2

  13. Exfiltration

  14. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects wbadmin backing up the NTDS database and registry hives while including ntds.dit in the target set, the domain credential-theft technique used in the Akira intrusion to copy the directory database via a loopback admin share. Adversaries abuse wbadmin to snapshot ntds.dit and the SYSTEM and SECURITY hives for offline hash extraction, so a wbadmin job referencing ntds.dit is a high-confidence dumping indicator.

Related detections9 linkedT1003.003 — drag to rearrange
Malicious NTDS Extraction via ntdsutil IFM (via process_creation)
Malicious NTDS Database Staging to Audit Directory (via file_event)
IFM Creation Detected from Commandline - Installation from Media (via process_creation)
Malicious Credential Hive Copy from Volume Shadow Copy
Malicious File Copy via Esentutl Volume Shadow Access (via process_creation)
Malicious NTDS Extraction via NetExec (via process_creation)
Malicious Active Directory Database Dump via ntdsutil IFM (via process_creation)
Malicious NTDS Extraction via Ntdsutil IFM Media Creation
Malicious NTDS.dit Extraction via ntdsutil IFM Snapshot (via process_creation)
Malicious Active Directory Database Backup via wbadmin to Loopback Admin Share (via process_creation)
Pivot detection · T1003.003 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.