Malicious AuKill EDR Killer Kernel Driver Load via Process Explorer Driver (via image_load)

PremiumReviewedSigma · High · v1
Product
windows
Category
image_load
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-10-27
Updated
2026-10-27

ATT&CK techniques

Persistence → Priv Esc
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Defense Evasion

  6. Cred Access

  7. Discovery

  8. Lateral Movement

  9. Collection

  10. C2

  11. Exfiltration

  12. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects the loading of the malicious Process Explorer kernel driver dropped by the AuKill EDR killer to terminate endpoint protection processes. AuKill drops a driver named PROCEXP.SYS or WindowsKernelExplorer.sys and loads it to gain kernel level access for disabling security tooling. Legitimate Process Explorer instead loads a driver named PROCEXP152.sys.

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Pivot detection · T1685 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.