Malicious Azure Elevate Access to User Access Administrator

PremiumReviewedSigma · High · v1
Product
azure
Service
activitylogs
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-09-14
Updated
2026-09-14

ATT&CK techniques

Persistence → Defense Evasion
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Cred Access

  6. Discovery

  7. Lateral Movement

  8. Collection

  9. C2

  10. Exfiltration

  11. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects the Microsoft.Authorization/elevateAccess/action operation, which assigns the calling Global Administrator the User Access Administrator role across all Azure subscriptions in the tenant. Adversaries who compromise a Global Administrator use elevateAccess to break out of Entra ID into the Azure resource plane and take control of every subscription. This is important because it is a high-impact privilege escalation that exposes all cloud resources.

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Malicious Azure Elevate Access to User Access Administrator
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Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.