Malicious Backup and Shadow Copy Destruction via Native Utilities

PremiumReviewedSigma · High · v1
Product
windows
Category
process_creation
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-07-11
Updated
2026-08-28

ATT&CK techniques

Impact
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Persistence

  6. Priv Esc

  7. Defense Evasion

  8. Cred Access

  9. Discovery

  10. Lateral Movement

  11. Collection

  12. C2

  13. Exfiltration

What it detects

This rule detects the deletion of volume shadow copies, backup catalogs, and recovery configuration through native Windows utilities, a recovery-inhibition step performed by Hunters International affiliates before encryption. Destroying backups to prevent restoration is a hallmark of ransomware impact activity and should be treated as high priority.

Related detections9 linkedT1490 — drag to rearrange
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Malicious Boot Recovery Disabled via Bcdedit (via process_creation)
Suspicious Symbolic Link Evaluation Enabled via fsutil by RansomHub Ransomware
Suspicious Volume Shadow Copy Deletion via PowerShell WMI by Akira Ransomware
VSS Backup Deletion or Resize (via process_creation)
Malicious Boot Recovery Tampering via Bcdedit (via process_creation)
Malicious Inhibition of System Recovery via Shadow Copy or Backup Deletion (via process_creation)
Malicious Windows Native Backup Deletion (via process_creation)
DragonForce Ransomware Volume Shadow Copy Deletion via WMIC ShadowCopy Where Delete (via process_creation)
Malicious Backup and Shadow Copy Destruction via Native Utilities
Pivot detection · T1490 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.