Malicious Bad Apples Data Exfiltration via snmptrap OID

PremiumReviewedSigma · High · v1
Product
macos
Category
process_creation
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-06-07
Updated
2026-08-28

ATT&CK techniques

Exfiltration
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Persistence

  6. Priv Esc

  7. Defense Evasion

  8. Cred Access

  9. Discovery

  10. Lateral Movement

  11. Collection

  12. C2

  13. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects snmptrap sending data to the attacker-specific enterprise OID 1.3.6.1.4.1.99999, matching the Bad Apples abuse of native macOS SNMP tooling to smuggle collected data out over an alternate protocol. Encoding stolen information inside SNMP trap fields evades controls focused on HTTP and DNS exfiltration. Use of this fabricated OID with snmptrap indicates covert exfiltration.

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Malicious Bad Apples Data Exfiltration via snmptrap OID
Pivot detection · T1048 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.