Malicious BadIIS C2 Communication via lwxatisme User-Agent

PremiumReviewedSigma · High · v1
Category
proxy
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-09-12
Updated
2026-09-12

ATT&CK techniques

Persistence → C2
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Priv Esc

  6. Defense Evasion

  7. Cred Access

  8. Discovery

  9. Lateral Movement

  10. Collection

  11. Exfiltration

  12. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects HTTP traffic carrying the User-Agent string lwxatisme, a fixed marker used by the commodity BadIIS ecosystem tracked by Talos to authenticate to its C2. The BadIIS native IIS module keys off this hardcoded agent to gate operator commands. Presence of this User-Agent indicates a BadIIS-infected server communicating with its controller.

Related detections9 linkedT1071.001 — drag to rearrange
Malicious BadIIS SEO Poisoning C2 Request via Web Server (via webserver)
Possible GammaSteel C2 Using Spoofed iPhone User Agent
Suspicious PolarEdge Backdoor C2 URL with Module and putdata Command (via proxy)
Suspicious Interlock Backdoor C2 Beacon to init1234 Endpoint (via proxy)
Possible FakeBat Loader Payload Download and C2 URI Patterns
Suspicious HATVIBE C2 Beacon via HTTP PUT to PHP Endpoints (via proxy)
Malicious DDoSia Client C2 Check-In via Fixed User-Agent
Suspicious ctfmon.exe Network Connection to PikaBot C2 Ports
Malicious AddInProcess32 Network Beacon on PureRAT C2 Ports
Malicious BadIIS C2 Communication via lwxatisme User-Agent
Pivot detection · T1071.001 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.