Malicious BadIIS SEO Poisoning C2 Request via Web Server (via webserver)

PremiumReviewedSigma · High · v1
Category
webserver
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-05-06
Updated
2026-08-28

ATT&CK techniques

Persistence → C2
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Priv Esc

  6. Defense Evasion

  7. Cred Access

  8. Discovery

  9. Lateral Movement

  10. Collection

  11. Exfiltration

  12. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects HTTP requests to the hardcoded BadIIS command-and-control endpoint used by the Operation Rewrite SEO poisoning campaign. The BadIIS native IIS module intercepts requests and communicates with attacker infrastructure through this fixed URI path. Detecting these requests exposes a compromised IIS server acting as a malicious proxy for SEO fraud and traffic redirection.

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Malicious BadIIS SEO Poisoning C2 Request via Web Server (via webserver)
Pivot detection · T1071.001 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.