Malicious Black Basta ESXi Ransomware Volume Enumeration and Encryption via Command Line (via process_creation)

PremiumReviewedSigma · High · v1
Product
linux
Category
process_creation
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-11-01
Updated
2026-11-01

ATT&CK techniques

Discovery → Impact
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Persistence

  6. Priv Esc

  7. Defense Evasion

  8. Cred Access

  9. Lateral Movement

  10. Collection

  11. C2

  12. Exfiltration

What it detects

This rule detects command line execution that enumerates the ESXi datastore path under vmfs volumes together with the Black Basta encrypted file extension, matching the cross-platform Linux and ESXi variant of the ransomware. It is associated with the Black Basta ransomware targeting VMware ESXi as reported by Uptycs. Attackers scan virtual machine storage before mass encryption to maximize impact, so this pattern indicates an active hypervisor-level attack.

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Malicious Dire Wolf Ransomware Encrypted File Extension on Disk (via file_event)
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Malicious Black Basta ESXi Ransomware Volume Enumeration and Encryption via Command Line (via process_creation)
Pivot detection · T1486 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.