Malicious BlueNoroff Zshenv Persistence Marker Creation via tmp Init File (via file_event)

PremiumReviewedSigma · High · v1
Product
macos
Category
file_event
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-10-27
Updated
2026-10-27

ATT&CK techniques

Persistence → Priv Esc
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Defense Evasion

  6. Cred Access

  7. Discovery

  8. Lateral Movement

  9. Collection

  10. C2

  11. Exfiltration

  12. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects the marker file that BlueNoroff writes to signal successful installation of its novel Zshenv persistence during the Hidden Risk campaign. The malware abuses the shell configuration file that is sourced for every Zsh session and drops a hidden success marker under tmp. The marker file name is unique to this implant.

Related detections4 linkedT1546.004 — drag to rearrange
Suspicious Shell Profile Persistence Injection with Downloader
Malicious Koske Persistence via Systemd Service and Shell Profile Hijack (via process_creation)
Suspicious Shell Profile Persistence Modification (via process_creation)
Linux Auditd: Unix Shell Configuration File Modification
Malicious BlueNoroff Zshenv Persistence Marker Creation via tmp Init File (via file_event)
Pivot detection · T1546.004 · 4 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.