Malicious Boot Recovery Tampering via Bcdedit

PremiumReviewedSigma · High · v1
Product
windows
Category
process_creation
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-09-29
Updated
2026-09-29

ATT&CK techniques

Impact
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Persistence

  6. Priv Esc

  7. Defense Evasion

  8. Cred Access

  9. Discovery

  10. Lateral Movement

  11. Collection

  12. C2

  13. Exfiltration

What it detects

This rule detects bcdedit setting bootstatuspolicy to ignoreallfailures which suppresses Windows recovery prompts after crashes, an inhibit-recovery action used by ransomware to keep encrypted systems booting normally. This was observed during Crux ransomware deployment. The change prevents automatic recovery and helps the encryptor complete uninterrupted.

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Malicious Boot Recovery Tampering via Bcdedit
Pivot detection · T1490 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.