Malicious Bring-Your-Own-Vulnerable-Driver Load for EDR Killing

PremiumReviewedSigma · High · v1
Product
windows
Category
driver_load
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-08-12
Updated
2026-08-28

ATT&CK techniques

Persistence → Priv Esc
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Defense Evasion

  6. Cred Access

  7. Discovery

  8. Lateral Movement

  9. Collection

  10. C2

  11. Exfiltration

  12. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects loading of vulnerable signed drivers abused by EDR-killer tooling including BdApiUtil.sys, TfSysMon.sys, K7RKScan.sys, ThrottleStop.sys and HwRwDrv.sys. Attackers load these drivers to gain kernel primitives for terminating security processes via DeviceIoControl, so their presence signals an imminent defense-disabling attempt.

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Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.