Malicious C2 Communication via cur1-request User-Agent on macOS

PremiumReviewedSigma · High · v1
Product
macos
Category
process_creation
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-09-29
Updated
2026-09-29

ATT&CK techniques

C2
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Persistence

  6. Priv Esc

  7. Defense Evasion

  8. Cred Access

  9. Discovery

  10. Lateral Movement

  11. Collection

  12. Exfiltration

  13. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects a process command line containing the misspelled user-agent cur1-request, a distinctive command-and-control string used by BlueNoroff implants in the Web3 macOS intrusion analyzed by Huntress. The malware sets this hardcoded user-agent when beaconing to attacker infrastructure. Because the string is unique to this tooling, its presence is a high-confidence C2 indicator.

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Malicious C2 Communication via cur1-request User-Agent on macOS
Pivot detection · T1071.001 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.