Malicious CastleLoader C2 Communication via Hardcoded User-Agent

PremiumReviewedSigma · High · v1
Category
proxy
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-09-06
Updated
2026-09-06

ATT&CK techniques

C2
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Persistence

  6. Priv Esc

  7. Defense Evasion

  8. Cred Access

  9. Discovery

  10. Lateral Movement

  11. Collection

  12. Exfiltration

  13. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects outbound HTTP requests using the hardcoded non-standard User-Agent token associated with CastleLoader C2 check-ins. The loader beacons to its server with this fixed string before receiving tasks.

Related detections9 linkedT1071.001 — drag to rearrange
Possible Remcos C2 Connection from eilowutil Process
Possible MOVEit Transfer SSRF via MOVEitISAPI action m2
Suspicious Tomcat Campaign Command and Control Domain Resolution (via dns_query)
Suspicious TeamTNT Command and Control Domain Resolution (via dns_query)
Suspicious Outbound Connection From CasPol Binary
Suspicious Cobalt Strike Loader C2 Traffic via Forged MSIE yie9 User-Agent (via proxy)
GateDoor Command-and-Control via gateway REST Endpoints (via proxy)
PATCHCORD Beacon C2 Tasking via api.jsp clientId Poll (via proxy)
SilentMare Loader C2 Beacon via Custom GatewayClient User-Agent (via proxy)
Malicious CastleLoader C2 Communication via Hardcoded User-Agent
Pivot detection · T1071.001 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.