huntrule

Malicious Clearing of Windows Event Logs (via process_creation)

PremiumReviewedSigma · High · v1
Product
windows
Category
process_creation
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-08-15
Updated
2026-08-28
AnalysisDetection

ATT&CK techniques

  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Persistence

  6. Priv Esc

  7. Defense Evasion

  8. Cred Access

  9. Discovery

  10. Lateral Movement

  11. Collection

  12. C2

  13. Exfiltration

  14. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects command-line clearing of Windows event logs through wevtutil or the PowerShell Clear-EventLog and Remove-EventLog cmdlets, an indicator-removal action used to destroy forensic evidence. Defense evasion via log tampering appears throughout the Red Canary Threat Detection Report, typically after an adversary has established access and wants to cover their tracks. Because legitimate bulk log-clearing on endpoints is rare, this is a high-fidelity signal of hands-on-keyboard activity.

Reporting behind it

Related detections9 linkedT1685.005 — drag to rearrange
Suspicious Windows Event Log Clearing via wevtutil (via process_creation)
Malicious USN Change Journal Deletion via Fsutil for Anti-Forensics
Suspicious Windows Event Log Clearing via wevtutil
Suspicious Windows Event Log Cleared via wevtutil during Ransomware Staging (via process_creation)
Suspicious Deletion of Terminal Server Client History via reg by UNC1549
Suspicious Windows Event Log Clearing via process_creation
Malicious Windows Event Log Clearing via wevtutil
Suspicious Event Log Clearing via Renamed Log Utility
Suspicious Event Log Clearing via PowerShell Invoke-Expression
Malicious Clearing of Windows Event Logs (via process_creation)
Pivot detection · T1685.005 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.