Malicious Cloud Credential Enumeration Piped to Network Exfiltration (via process_creation)

PremiumReviewedSigma · High · v1
Category
process_creation
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-11-05
Updated
2026-11-05

ATT&CK techniques

Cred Access → Exfiltration
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Persistence

  6. Priv Esc

  7. Defense Evasion

  8. Discovery

  9. Lateral Movement

  10. Collection

  11. C2

  12. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects an AWS STS caller-identity call whose output is piped into curl or wget to exfiltrate the caller context to a remote host. This pattern was triggered by an auto-loaded MCP configuration in the Amazon Q VS Code extension where a child process inherited AWS credentials. Attackers use it to confirm and steal an inherited cloud identity for follow-on access.

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Malicious Cloud Credential Enumeration Piped to Network Exfiltration (via process_creation)
Pivot detection · T1552.001 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.