Malicious Cobalt Strike C2 Beaconing via REST URI Paths and Legacy MSIE User-Agent (via proxy)

PremiumReviewedSigma · High · v1
Category
proxy
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-06-26
Updated
2026-08-28

ATT&CK techniques

C2
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Persistence

  6. Priv Esc

  7. Defense Evasion

  8. Cred Access

  9. Discovery

  10. Lateral Movement

  11. Collection

  12. Exfiltration

  13. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects HTTP command-and-control beaconing that combines the /rest/funcStatus and /rest/policy/3/ URI paths with a legacy MSIE 7.0 .NET CLR User-Agent, a Malleable C2 profile used by a multi-stage Cobalt Strike loader analyzed by Joe Sandbox. Adversaries craft these profiles to blend beacon traffic into ordinary web requests, making the combined URI and User-Agent pattern a reliable signal of an active beacon before hands-on-keyboard activity.

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Malicious Cobalt Strike C2 Beaconing via REST URI Paths and Legacy MSIE User-Agent (via proxy)
Pivot detection · T1071.001 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.