Malicious Cobalt Strike Loader via rundll32 From ProgramData (via process_creation)

PremiumReviewedSigma · High · v1
Category
process_creation
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-10-15
Updated
2026-10-15

ATT&CK techniques

Defense Evasion
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Persistence

  6. Priv Esc

  7. Defense Evasion

  8. Cred Access

  9. Discovery

  10. Lateral Movement

  11. Collection

  12. C2

  13. Exfiltration

  14. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects rundll32.exe executing a DLL from the ProgramData directory using the DllRegisterServer export, the Cobalt Strike loading pattern seen in a LockBit 3.0 intrusion. Legitimate DLLs are rarely staged in ProgramData and run this way. Proxying a beacon through a signed binary from a writable path enables stealthy command-and-control ahead of ransomware deployment.

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Malicious Cobalt Strike Loader via rundll32 From ProgramData (via process_creation)
Pivot detection · T1218.011 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.