Malicious COM Hijack via CLSID InProcServer32 Registry Modification (via registry_set)

PremiumReviewedSigma · High · v1
Category
registry_set
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-07-04
Updated
2026-08-28

ATT&CK techniques

Persistence → Priv Esc
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Defense Evasion

  6. Cred Access

  7. Discovery

  8. Lateral Movement

  9. Collection

  10. C2

  11. Exfiltration

  12. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects a COM hijack targeting the CLSID 2227A280-3AEA-1069-A2DE-08002B30309D by writing to its InProcServer32 registry value. In Operation Phantom Net Voxel APT28 abuses this specific shell folder CLSID so that explorer loads a malicious DLL for persistence and execution. Redirecting this InProcServer32 value to an attacker DLL is a reliable indicator of COM hijacking.

Related detections9 linkedT1546.015 — drag to rearrange
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Malicious COM Hijack of PSFactoryBuffer InprocServer32
Malicious APT-C-60 COM Hijack via SpyGlace CLSID InProcServer32 (via registry_set)
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Malicious COM Object Hijack Pointing to IconCache DLL
Suspicious COM Hijack via CLSID InprocServer32 Pointing to Writable Path (via registry_set)
Windows COM CLSID Hijacking via Registry Default InprocServer32/LocalServer32 Modification
Windows Registry COM InProcServer32 Hijack via PSFactory CLSID Default Value
Malicious COM Hijack via CLSID InProcServer32 Registry Modification (via registry_set)
Pivot detection · T1546.015 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.