Malicious COM Hijacking via TinyTurla CLSID InprocServer32 (via registry_set)

PremiumReviewedSigma · High · v1
Product
windows
Category
registry_set
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-09-12
Updated
2026-09-12

ATT&CK techniques

Persistence → Priv Esc
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Defense Evasion

  6. Cred Access

  7. Discovery

  8. Lateral Movement

  9. Collection

  10. C2

  11. Exfiltration

  12. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects registration of the TinyTurla-NG CLSID {C2796011-...} InprocServer32 under the current user Classes hive, a COM hijacking persistence mechanism used by Turla. Loading the backdoor DLL through a hijacked COM object survives reboots and runs under a trusted host process.

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Pivot detection · T1546.015 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.