Malicious Container Escape via chroot to Host Mount

ATT&CK techniques

Priv Esc

Recon
Resource Dev
Initial Access
Execution
Persistence
Priv Esc
- T1611Escape to Host
Defense Evasion
Cred Access
Discovery
Lateral Movement
Collection
C2
Exfiltration
Impact

What it detects

This rule detects a process invoking chroot into a mounted host filesystem path from within a privileged container. This behavior matches Dirty DAG where an attacker ran a privileged pod that mounted and chrooted into the underlying node to escape the container. Chrooting into a host mount is a definitive container escape technique granting node-level control.

Reporting behind it

Related detections9 linkedT1611 — drag to rearrange

Suspicious Docker Socket Access via curl Unix Socket for Container Escape

Malicious Kubernetes Node Escape via chroot to Node kubectl Path

Suspicious Kubernetes Pod Deployment with Privileged or Host Namespace Flags

Suspicious Privileged or Host Namespace Kubernetes Pod Creation

Malicious Privileged Container Creation in Kubernetes (via audit)

Malicious Docker Socket Access via Curl Unix Socket

Suspicious Cgroup release_agent Abuse for Container Escape

Malicious Direct etcd Write to Kubernetes Registry via ETCDCTL_API (via process_creation)

Malicious Container Escape via core_pattern Hijack (via process_creation)

Malicious Container Escape via chroot to Host Mount

Pivot detection · T1611 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.

Full detection rule

Unlock this rule to view and copy it

The detection logic is included with a plan. Everything else — context, mappings and implementation details — stays free on this page.

Sign in for 3 free unlocks

Signing in gives you 3 unlocks to spend on any rule in the library. No card, and they do not expire.

Also included

Unlocked rules convert on this page — to Splunk SPL or Splunk — Raw Index SPL or Microsoft Sentinel KQL or Microsoft Sentinel ASIM ASIM KQL or Microsoft Defender XDR KQL or Elastic Security KQL or Elastic Security Lucene or Elastic Security ES|QL or CrowdStrike Falcon CQL or SentinelOne PowerQuery or Palo Alto Cortex XDR XQL or Carbon Black Cloud Platform Search or Carbon Black EDR Process Search or Google Security Operations UDM Search or IBM QRadar AQL or Sumo Logic Cloud SIEM Rules expression or Rapid7 InsightIDR LEQL or Graylog Search or OpenSearch Lucene or OpenSearch PPL PPL or Grafana Loki LogQL or SQLite SQL or Zircolite SQLite — with the log-source profile the engine picked, the field map it used, and everything it could not express. Converting a rule you have unlocked costs no further credit.

See it run on a free rule →Convert your own rule →