Malicious Container Escape via Nsenter Host Namespace Entry

PremiumReviewedSigma · High · v1
Product
linux
Category
process_creation
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-10-29
Updated
2026-10-29

ATT&CK techniques

Priv Esc
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Persistence

  6. Defense Evasion

  7. Cred Access

  8. Discovery

  9. Lateral Movement

  10. Collection

  11. C2

  12. Exfiltration

  13. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects nsenter used to enter the host init process namespaces, the breakout step an agentic threat actor performed after gaining a privileged container. Entering PID 1 mount and other namespaces grants full host command execution from inside a container. This pattern reliably indicates a container escape attempt.

Related detections9 linkedT1611 — drag to rearrange
Malicious Container Escape via chroot to Host Mount
Suspicious Docker Socket Access via curl Unix Socket for Container Escape
Malicious Kubernetes Node Escape via chroot to Node kubectl Path
Suspicious Kubernetes Pod Deployment with Privileged or Host Namespace Flags
Suspicious Privileged or Host Namespace Kubernetes Pod Creation
Malicious Privileged Container Creation in Kubernetes (via audit)
Malicious Docker Socket Access via Curl Unix Socket
Suspicious Cgroup release_agent Abuse for Container Escape
Malicious Direct etcd Write to Kubernetes Registry via ETCDCTL_API (via process_creation)
Malicious Container Escape via Nsenter Host Namespace Entry
Pivot detection · T1611 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.