Malicious Container Escape via Privileged Docker Host PID Namespace

ATT&CK techniques

Execution → Defense Evasion

Recon
Resource Dev
Initial Access
Execution
- T1610Deploy Container
Persistence
Priv Esc
Defense Evasion
- T1610Deploy Container
Cred Access
Discovery
Lateral Movement
Collection
C2
Exfiltration
Impact

What it detects

This rule detects a Docker container launched with both privileged mode and the host PID namespace, a container escape primitive documented in Elastic Linux persistence research. Combining these flags lets an attacker use nsenter to break out into the host namespaces and gain full node control. Legitimate workloads rarely require both flags together making this a strong escape indicator.

Reporting behind it

Related detections4 linkedT1610 — drag to rearrange

Suspicious Privileged Docker Container Launch With Host chroot

Malicious Docker Client Targeting Remote Exposed 2375 API

Suspicious Shell Execution Into Kubernetes Pod via API

Malicious Privileged Container Launch With Host Root Mount via Docker

Malicious Container Escape via Privileged Docker Host PID Namespace

Pivot detection · T1610 · 4 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.

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