Malicious Credential Added to an Azure AD Application (via auditlogs)

PremiumReviewedSigma · High · v1
Product
azure
Service
auditlogs
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-07-29
Updated
2026-08-28

ATT&CK techniques

Persistence → Priv Esc
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Defense Evasion

  6. Cred Access

  7. Discovery

  8. Lateral Movement

  9. Collection

  10. C2

  11. Exfiltration

  12. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects a password or key credential being added to an Azure AD application or service principal, an account-manipulation technique that grants an attacker persistent, app-based access to a tenant. Adding application credentials is tracked in the Red Canary Threat Detection Report cloud coverage. Detecting this operation surfaces a stealthy tenant backdoor being created.

Related detections9 linkedT1098.001 — drag to rearrange
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Suspicious AWS Administrator Policy Attachment via CloudTrail (via aws)
Suspicious AWS Inline Policy Granting Full S3 Access
Suspicious GCP Service Account Key Creation for Persistence (via gcp.audit)
Suspicious AWS Long-Term Access Key Creation for Persistence via CloudTrail (via aws)
Suspicious Credential Added to Existing Application for OAuth Persistence in Entra ID (via azure auditlogs)
Suspicious IAM Policy Attachment Granting AdministratorAccess
Suspicious Credential Added to Application or Service Principal in Entra ID (via azure)
Okta System Log: New Identity Provider Created via system.idp.lifecycle.create
Malicious Credential Added to an Azure AD Application (via auditlogs)
Pivot detection · T1098.001 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.