Malicious DarkMe COM Object Execution via rundll32 CLSID

PremiumReviewedSigma · High · v1
Product
windows
Category
process_creation
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-09-26
Updated
2026-09-26

ATT&CK techniques

Persistence → Defense Evasion
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Defense Evasion

  6. Cred Access

  7. Discovery

  8. Lateral Movement

  9. Collection

  10. C2

  11. Exfiltration

  12. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects rundll32.exe instantiating the DarkMe malware COM object by its hardcoded CLSID EA6FC2FF-7AE6-4534-9495-F688FEC7858C. This chain is used by actors exploiting the WinRAR CVE-2023-38831 zero-day to load GuLoader and Remcos. Executing malicious code through a COM CLSID abuses a trusted binary to evade detection.

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Pivot detection · T1218.011 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.