Malicious Data Exfiltration to Restic REST Server over HTTP (via process_creation)

PremiumReviewedSigma · High · v1
Product
windows
Category
process_creation
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-05-03
Updated
2026-08-28

ATT&CK techniques

Exfiltration
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Persistence

  6. Priv Esc

  7. Defense Evasion

  8. Cred Access

  9. Discovery

  10. Lateral Movement

  11. Collection

  12. C2

  13. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects the restic backup utility being pointed at a remote REST endpoint over HTTP to back up file-share directories, the exfiltration channel used in the Nitrogen BlackCat intrusion to stage stolen data before ransomware. Adversaries repurpose restic as a fast deduplicating uploader to attacker-controlled REST servers, so restic writing to a rest http repository is a strong pre-encryption data-theft signal.

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Malicious Data Exfiltration to Restic REST Server over HTTP (via process_creation)
Pivot detection · T1567.002 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.