Malicious Data Exfiltration via curl with Stealer Specific BuildID Header

PremiumReviewedSigma · High · v1
Product
macos
Category
process_creation
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-10-24
Updated
2026-10-24

ATT&CK techniques

Execution → Exfiltration
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Persistence

  5. Priv Esc

  6. Defense Evasion

  7. Cred Access

  8. Discovery

  9. Lateral Movement

  10. Collection

  11. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects curl invoked with the custom BuildID or buildid HTTP header used by the Atomic and Odyssey macOS information stealers to exfiltrate collected data to their command and control servers. These distinctive headers identify the stealer build during the collection upload. Detecting them surfaces active credential and data theft on macOS endpoints.

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Malicious Data Exfiltration via curl with Stealer Specific BuildID Header
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Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.