Malicious Directory Enumeration With Recon Tooling User Agent via Azure AD Graph

PremiumReviewedSigma · High · v1
Product
azure
Service
azureactivity
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-05-19
Updated
2026-08-28

ATT&CK techniques

Discovery
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Persistence

  6. Priv Esc

  7. Defense Evasion

  8. Cred Access

  9. Lateral Movement

  10. Collection

  11. C2

  12. Exfiltration

  13. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects Azure AD Graph requests carrying user agents belonging to known enumeration frameworks such as AzureHound BloodHound and AADInternals as described in Elastic research on AAD Graph activity logs. These tool signatures against the legacy Graph service indicate active directory reconnaissance for privilege escalation paths.

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Malicious Directory Enumeration With Recon Tooling User Agent via Azure AD Graph
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Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.