Malicious DLL Execution With Non Standard Extension via rundll32

PremiumReviewedSigma · High · v1
Product
windows
Category
process_creation
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-09-15
Updated
2026-09-15

ATT&CK techniques

Defense Evasion
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Persistence

  6. Priv Esc

  7. Cred Access

  8. Discovery

  9. Lateral Movement

  10. Collection

  11. C2

  12. Exfiltration

  13. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects rundll32.exe loading a library renamed with a .db extension which the DPRK aligned Stressed Pungsan npm campaign uses to masquerade its downloaded payload package.db and execute an exported function while evading extension based detection.

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Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.