Malicious dllFake Stealer Execution from WindowsApps Directory (via process_creation)

PremiumReviewedSigma · High · v1
Product
windows
Category
process_creation
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-10-23
Updated
2026-10-23

ATT&CK techniques

Cred Access → Collection
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Persistence

  6. Priv Esc

  7. Defense Evasion

  8. Discovery

  9. Lateral Movement

  10. C2

  11. Exfiltration

  12. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects execution of dllCrt32.exe or sysCrt32.exe from the LOCALAPPDATA Microsoft WindowsApps directory, the dropped stealer binaries Red Canary attributed to dllFake trojanized installers that share code with SecondEye. These named executables in the WindowsApps path are not legitimate Store aliases, so their execution indicates a data-stealing implant staged for credential and clipboard theft.

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Malicious dllFake Stealer Execution from WindowsApps Directory (via process_creation)
Pivot detection · T1555.003 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.