Malicious Domain and Enterprise Admins Group Addition via net group Domain Add (via process_creation)

PremiumReviewedSigma · High · v1
Product
windows
Category
process_creation
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-10-30
Updated
2026-10-30

ATT&CK techniques

Persistence → Priv Esc
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Defense Evasion

  6. Cred Access

  7. Discovery

  8. Lateral Movement

  9. Collection

  10. C2

  11. Exfiltration

  12. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects net or net1 adding an account to a Domain Admins or Enterprise Admins group with the domain switch, the privilege-escalation and persistence step in the ELPACO-team intrusion where a rogue account was promoted to the highest-privilege directory groups. Adversaries add controlled accounts to these groups to seize domain-wide control, so this command is a critical indicator of an account-takeover attempt.

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Malicious Domain and Enterprise Admins Group Addition via net group Domain Add (via process_creation)
Pivot detection · T1098 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.