Malicious DPAPI Credential Decryption via PowerShell ProtectedData Unprotect

ATT&CK techniques

Cred Access

Recon
Resource Dev
Initial Access
Execution
Persistence
Priv Esc
Defense Evasion
Cred Access
- T1555.003Credentials from Web Browsers
Discovery
Lateral Movement
Collection
C2
Exfiltration
Impact

What it detects

This rule detects PowerShell invoking the DPAPI ProtectedData Unprotect method to decrypt secrets from the current user context. SocGholish operators used this to unprotect stolen browser credential material after staging it locally. This lets attackers recover plaintext passwords without touching disk artifacts that alert defenders.

Reporting behind it

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Malicious DPAPI Credential Decryption via PowerShell ProtectedData Unprotect

Pivot detection · T1555.003 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.

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