Malicious ESXi Firewall Disable via esxcli (via process_creation)

PremiumReviewedSigma · High · v1
Product
linux
Category
process_creation
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-10-21
Updated
2026-10-21

ATT&CK techniques

  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Persistence

  6. Priv Esc

  7. Defense Evasion

  8. Cred Access

  9. Discovery

  10. Lateral Movement

  11. Collection

  12. C2

  13. Exfiltration

  14. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects the esxcli command that disables the ESXi host firewall, a defense-evasion action performed by the RansomHouse MrAgent tool before mass VM encryption. Turning off the hypervisor firewall opens management and lateral-movement paths ahead of the Mario ransomware deployment.

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Malicious WinRing0 Vulnerable Driver Load for Coin Mining
Windows Security Log: Defendnot scheduled task (defendnot) persistence via --from-autorun
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Malicious ESXi Firewall Disable via esxcli (via process_creation)
Pivot detection · T1685 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.