Malicious Fake Fortinet Patch Infostealer Execution (via process_creation)

PremiumReviewedSigma · High · v1
Product
windows
Category
process_creation
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-09-07
Updated
2026-09-07

ATT&CK techniques

Defense Evasion → Cred Access
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Persistence

  6. Priv Esc

  7. Discovery

  8. Lateral Movement

  9. Collection

  10. C2

  11. Exfiltration

  12. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects execution of a binary named FortiEndpoint_Patch.exe, the EKZ infostealer masqueraded as a Fortinet endpoint patch. It was delivered after FortiClient EMS exploitation to harvest browser credentials and cookies.

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Pivot detection · T1036.005 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.