Malicious Foomatic-Rip Filter Spawning Shell via CUPS Exploitation

ATT&CK techniques

Execution

Recon
Resource Dev
Initial Access
Execution
- T1059.004Unix Shell
- T1203Exploitation for Client Execution
Persistence
Priv Esc
Defense Evasion
Cred Access
Discovery
Lateral Movement
Collection
C2
Exfiltration
Impact

What it detects

This rule detects the foomatic-rip print filter spawning a command shell such as bash sh or dash which is the exploitation primitive in the CUPS printing system vulnerability chain. Adversaries abuse a crafted printer PPD FoomaticRIPCommandLine to achieve remote command execution on the print host.

Reporting behind it

Related detections9 linkedT1059.004 — drag to rearrange

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Malicious Foomatic-Rip Filter Spawning Shell via CUPS Exploitation

Pivot detection · T1059.004 · 9 related

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