Malicious FortiGateUpdate Service DLL Registration by Cyber Partisans (via registry_set)

PremiumReviewedSigma · High · v1
Product
windows
Category
registry_set
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-10-06
Updated
2026-10-06

ATT&CK techniques

Persistence → Defense Evasion
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Cred Access

  6. Discovery

  7. Lateral Movement

  8. Collection

  9. C2

  10. Exfiltration

  11. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects registration of a ServiceDll under the FortiGateUpdate service Parameters key, a masqueraded service used to load a DNSCat2 tunneling DLL. This behavior was observed in Cyber Partisans activity aimed at espionage and disruption against industrial targets. The security-product masquerade combined with a ServiceDll load is a strong persistence and C2 indicator.

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Malicious FortiGateUpdate Service DLL Registration by Cyber Partisans (via registry_set)
Pivot detection · T1543.003 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.