Malicious GenAI Browser Extension C2 and PAC Redirection (via proxy)

PremiumReviewedSigma · Medium · v1
Category
proxy
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-10-21
Updated
2026-10-21

ATT&CK techniques

Persistence → C2
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Priv Esc

  6. Defense Evasion

  7. Cred Access

  8. Discovery

  9. Lateral Movement

  10. Collection

  11. Exfiltration

  12. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects web traffic to the command-and-control WebSocket endpoint, proxy auto-config file, and data-exfiltration API used by high-risk generative-AI browser extensions reported by Unit 42. These extensions hijack browser proxy settings and read user email and session data, exfiltrating it to attacker infrastructure.

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Pivot detection · T1071.001 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.