Malicious GhostLocker2 C2 Communication via HTTP POST (via proxy)

PremiumReviewedSigma · High · v1
Category
proxy
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-09-12
Updated
2026-09-12

ATT&CK techniques

Exfiltration
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Persistence

  6. Priv Esc

  7. Defense Evasion

  8. Cred Access

  9. Discovery

  10. Lateral Movement

  11. Collection

  12. C2

  13. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects HTTP POST requests to the GhostLocker2 command-and-control endpoints /addInfection and /incrementLaunch used by GhostSec ransomware. These beacons report new infections and launch counts to the operator panel and indicate active ransomware deployment.

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Malicious GhostLocker2 C2 Communication via HTTP POST (via proxy)
Pivot detection · T1567.002 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.