Malicious GhostSocks Loader Execution with johnpidar Argument via process_creation

PremiumReviewedSigma · High · v1
Product
windows
Category
process_creation
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-06-26
Updated
2026-08-28

ATT&CK techniques

Priv Esc → C2
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Persistence

  6. Defense Evasion

  7. Cred Access

  8. Discovery

  9. Lateral Movement

  10. Collection

  11. Exfiltration

  12. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects process command lines containing the distinctive johnpidar argument. This hardcoded flag is passed to the GhostSocks loader delivered by fake OpenClaw installers, and its presence on a command line is a strong indicator of active infostealer and SOCKS proxy execution on the host.

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Malicious GhostSocks Loader Execution with johnpidar Argument via process_creation
Pivot detection · T1090 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.