Malicious GS-Netcat Command and Control via Global Socket Relay Network (via dns_query)

PremiumReviewedSigma · High · v1
Category
dns_query
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-10-27
Updated
2026-10-27

ATT&CK techniques

C2
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Persistence

  6. Priv Esc

  7. Defense Evasion

  8. Cred Access

  9. Discovery

  10. Lateral Movement

  11. Collection

  12. Exfiltration

  13. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects DNS resolution of the Global Socket Relay Network domain used by the GS-Netcat backdoor. In Operation Highland the Velvet Ant actor deployed GS-Netcat configured to reach single character subdomains of the relay network for reverse shell access. Resolution of this domain on servers is not expected in enterprise environments.

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Malicious GS-Netcat Command and Control via Global Socket Relay Network (via dns_query)
Pivot detection · T1071.004 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.